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Abstract The rstorder temporal logics with   and
 
of time structures
isomorphic to   discrete linear time and trees of  segments linear time
with branching gaps and some of its fragments are compared The rst is
not recursively axiomatizable For the second a cutfree complete sequent
calculus is given and from this a resolution system is derived by the method
of Maslov
  Introduction
In recent years various temporal logics have been studied and applied to the de
scription and analysis of dynamic properties of programs  The investigations
have focussed on discrete linearly ordered wellfounded temporal structures be
cause temporal states can then be identied with program states It turns out that
the rstorder logics corresponding to this semantics are not recursively axiomati
zable if   	henceforth always
 and
 
	nexttime
 are present in the language It is
possible to characterize the set of natural numbers by    U 	x
 where U 	x
 holds
for exactly one domain element at each state and is determined by a recursion in
 
	see 
 This incompleteness result is based on a standard model of linear time
if similarity types are allowed  one can obtain completeness results for rst order
temporal logic relative to classes of models of linear time 	see 
 With a change
in the semantics 	branching time gaps
 however a complete rstorder logic can
be obtained this is the subject of the present paper Our proof of completeness
can be carried over to several types of futureoriented temporal operators 	see 

there may be problems however if future and pastoriented operators are present
simultaneously
For simplicity we consider here only languages with   and
 
as the only tem
poral operators and constants as the only function symbols We compare the logic
of discrete linear time TL to the logic of discrete linear time with branching time
gaps TB In both logics the semantics of the temporal operators are as usual a
formula  A is true at a time point t i A is true at every time point  t a formula
 
A is true at t i A is true at t   The dierence lies in the admitted time
structures for TL this is the class of structures order isomorphic to  We call
such a structure an segment In such a segment there is always an earliest point
for every point there is a unique next point and every point can be reached from
the earliest point by passing nitely often to the next point For TB the admitted
 
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
structures are isomorphic to 	possibly innitary
 wellfounded trees of segments
There is always a unique earliest next point in time but also points after the gap
	which cannot be reached by successively passing on to the next point
 which are
initial states in the next segments themselves etc
We give a sequent calculus for TB which is shown to be cutfree complete by an
extension of Schuttes reduction tree method The rules of the calculus constructed
are not analytic in the sense that the formulas in the premises are not proper sub
formulas of the conclusion Therefore cutfree proofs in general lack the subformula
property a property essential for usual methods of proof search The completeness
proof shows however that we can salvage a large part of analyticity enough to
be able to construct a resolution system for the logic Every valid sequent has a
cutfree proof which uses only formulas A and
 
A where A is a subformula of the
endsequent Exploiting this property we construct a complete resolution method
for TB using the method of Maslov  
In a sense then the investigations of TB can also be seen as a case study in
	a
 how far the completeness proof of Schutte can be carried and 	b
 how to over
come mild forms of nonanalyticity It also sheds some light on necessary conditions
for the resolution calculus to be sound 	completeness is not problematic

The paper is organized as follows In Section  the semantical structures un
derlying the logics TL and TB are introduced and a proof of nonaxiomatizability
of TL is sketched In Section  we present the sequent calculus LB for TB The
completeness proof for LB is presented in Section  Section  contains some re
marks comparing 	fragments of
 TL and TB The resolution system for TB is
developed in Section  Finally we conclude with a discussion of the signicance of
the completeness result for future applications
 Firstorder Temporal Logics
We consider the following rstorder language free variables a b c a
 
     bound
variables x y z x
 
     constant symbols f  g h f
 
     predicate symbols of
arbitrary arity P  Q R P
 
     propositional connectives      quantiers
  and the temporal operators   	always

 
	next time
 Formulas are built up
from the symbols as usual The sometime operator  is introduced by denition
A     A If A  	
 

 
 
 	
n
B where 	
i
is either   or
 
 then 	
 

 
 
 	
n
is called
the temporal prex of A The semantics of a rstorder temporal logic is dened as
follows
Denition  Let T be a denumerable partially ordered set T belongs to the
class L of linear discrete orders i it is order isomorphic to  it belongs to the
class B of linear discrete orders with branching gaps i it is order isomorphic to a
wellfounded tree of segments
Denition  Let T be L or B and let Frm	L
 be the set of formulas
over some rstorder temporal language L A structure K for L is a tuple
hT fD
i
g
iT
 fS
i
g
iT
i where T  T  D
i
is a set called the domain at state i
D
i
 D
j
if i  j S
i
is a function mapping free variables and constant symbols
to elements of D
i
 and nary predicate symbols to functions from D
n
i
to fg
We dene the valuation functions K
i
from Frm	L
 to fg as follows Let A
be a temporal formula and not and or impl be the truth functions for negation
conjunction disjunction and implication respectively
	
 A  P 	t
 
     t
n

 K
i
	A
  S
i
	P 

 
S
i
	t
 

    S
i
	t
n



	
 A   B K
i
	A
  not	K
i
	B


	
 A  B C K
i
	A
  and	K
i
	B
K
i
	C



	
 A  B C K
i
	A
  or	K
i
	B
K
i
	C


	
 A  B  C K
i
	A
  impl	K
i
	B
K
i
	C


	
 A  	x
B	x
 K
i
	A
   if K
i
dx	A	d

   for every d  D
i
 and  
otherwise
	
 A  	x
B	x
 K
i
	A
   if K
i
dx	A	d

   for some d  D
i
and  
otherwise
	
 A   B K
i
	A
   if K
j
	B
   for every j  i and   otherwise
	
 A 
 
B K
i
	A
   if K
i 
	B
   and   otherwise
A formulaA is satised in a temporal structure KK j A iK

	A
  A is valid
in a class of temporal structures T  T j A i every K  hT fD
i
g
iT
 fS
i
g
iT
i
with T  T satises A
Denition  The logic of linear discrete time TL is the set of all formulas
A  Frm	L
 st L j A The logic of linear discrete time with branching gaps TB
is the set of all formulas A  Frm	L
 st B j A
Example  In TL the formula  
 
A 
 
 A is valid In TB however
only
 
 A   
 
A holds The other direction  
 
A 
 
 A does not hold in
general as can be seen by evaluating the formula on the countermodel K 
h   fD
i
g
i
 fS
i
g
i
i where S

	A
   and S
i
	A
   for i   i  
The semantics considered here is usually called initial semantics Normal se
mantics is dened via truth in all states not only in K

 We will need the following
lemma later on
Lemma  Let A be a formula
 j A i A is true in every world in every temporal structure
 j A i j  A
	 j A i j
 
A
Proof 	
 If trivial Only if Let T be a temporal structure in which A is not
true at a state i Consider T

 fj  T j j  ig T

is also a temporal structure
and since our logics contain no operators acting backwards in time A is true at
state i in T

if it was true in state i in T  But i is the initial state in T


	
 If by the truth denition of   Only if immediate by 	

	
 If Let T be a structure where A is false in the initial world Consider
T

 T  

with 

  and S

 
 S

 The addition of a state before the initial
state does not change the truth of formulas in T  But in T


 
A is false in the initial
world Only if immediate by 	
  
Remark 
 The logics we consider dier from the ones in the literature in that we
do not use global and local variables but the interpretation of predicate symbols can
vary over the states This is more in keeping with the tradition in quanticational
modal logics However by using the Barcan formulas for   and
 
 denable two
sortedness and other expressible concepts most eects of global and local variables
can be simulated Another minor dierence is in the denition of   Krogers  
is dened via truth in all later worlds in Krogers logic our   can be dened by
 A A his   can be expressed by
 
 A in TL
As indicated in the introduction the logic TL is not axiomatizable This was
shown for the original formulation of Kroger by Szalas  and Kroger  Two bi
nary function symbols have to be present for the results to hold If the operator until
is also present or if quantication over local variables is allowed then the empty

signature suces as was shown by Szalas and Holenderski  and Kroger  re
spectively
Following Szalas  and Kroger  we sketch a proof for the incompleteness re
sult for TL with equality where the signature contains two binary function symbols
	equivalently two ternary predicate symbols

Let

designate the successor function and the constant  the number zero
Consider the formula axiomatizing the predicate U 
U 	
  	x


U 	x
  	y

 
y  x


 
U 	y



 	x
	y

 
U 	x
  U 	y
  x  y


In every model U 	x
 represents exactly the set of natural numbers If the lan
guage is expressive enough we can write down the usual axioms for addition and
multiplication 	eg Robinsons Q
 A sentence of arithmetic is true in the natu
ral numbers i its relativization to U 	x
 follows in TL from these axioms The
nonaxiomatizability of TL thus follows from Godels Incompleteness Theorems
 A Sequent Calculus for TB
In the standard denition a sequent is an expression of the form
A
 
     A
k
 B
 
     B

where the A
i
and B
j
are rstorder formulas For the purpose of completeness proofs
it is more convenient to use instead innite sequents 	see eg Takeutis book 
Ch 
 More precisely the completeness theorem requires a generalization of
nite sequences of formulas to countably innite wellordered sequences We will
use this more general notion of sequents and indicate the use of nite sequents
explicitly
Let  be a countable 	possibly nite
 wellordered sequence If  is order iso
morphic to the wellordered set of numbers 	 via a mapping 
 st 
	i
  A
i
for
i  	 then we write   	A
i


i

Denition  A sequent is an expression of the form    where  and  are
countable wellordered sequences of rstorder temporal formulas
Denition  The sequence 	A
i


i
is called a subsequence of 	A
i


i
if 	  
and there exists an orderpreserving  mapping 	   If the sequences are
nite and   f     ng then 	 is of the form fi
 
     i
k
g  f     ng A sequent


 

is called a subsequent of    if 

and 

are subsequences of  and
 respectively
Denition  Let 	S
i


i
be a sequence of sequents st S
i
 
i
 
i
for i  
Then the sequent S  	
i


i
 	
i


i
is called the union sequent of 	S
i


i
Note that the order type of 	
i


i
is characterized by the property if i  j and
	
i
 	
j
are the wellordered sets of numbers corresponding to 
i
and 
j
respectively
then all elements of 	
i
are smaller than all elements of 	
j

The validity of nite sequents is dened as usual A
 
     A
k
 B
 
     B
k
is
valid in TL 	TB
 i 	A
 
   A
k

  	B
 
   B
l

 is valid in TL 	TB
 A nite
sequent is provable if it has a derivation in a suitable calculus
The concepts of provability 	dened for nite sequents originally
 can be ex
tended to the innite case via the usual compactness condition
Denition  A 	not necessarily nite
 sequent S is called provable if there exists
a nite subsequent of S which is provable

It is only a matter of convention that we use the term provable for innite
sequents as LB works only on nite sequents This convention is however of es
sential advantage in completeness proofs In our completeness proof we do not need
the semantics of innite sequents particularly we do not speak about 	semantic

compactness 	ie about the property that an innite sequent is valid i there exists
a nite subsequent which is valid

As basis for the sequent calculus LB for TB we take a variant of Gentzens
calculus LK for classical predicate logic The rules of LK are wellknown and can
be found in eg  We use a weakening friendly formulation of the rules The
side formulas in the premises of the rules 	right
 	left
 and 	left
 are not
required to be identical eg
  A 

 

 B
 

 

 A B instead of
  A   B
  A B
LB consists of the rules of LK plus the following rules for
 
and  
A
 
 A  
 A  
 left
  A 

 


 
 A
 

 

 A
 right
  
 
 
 

nex
   A
    A
nec
Note that LB 	like LK
 is dened for nite sequents only If  is A
 
     A
n

then
 
 denotes the sequence
 
A
 
    
 
A
n
	similarly for   
 The notations
 
 and   can be extended to innite sequents in a straightforward way 	eg
 
	A
i


i
 	
 
A
i


i

 Note that unlike the rules of LK the rules 	 left
 and
	 right
 are not analytic 	ie the subformula property does not hold
 The rule
	nex
 works on the left and right sides of the sequent simultaneously 	but is ana
lytic
 and 	nec
 is context dependent It is clear that 	nec
 corresponds to the
necessitation rule common in Hilbertstyle modal calculi When using rules with
two auxiliary formulas in one premise 	ie 	right
 or 	 left

 the inference is
admitted even if only one formula is actually present 	implicit weakening
 Alter
natively we could have split the rule into two in a similar way as the 	right
 and
	left
 rules Otherwise the notion of proof is the standard one 	cf  Ch x 

In particular recall that initial sequents are of the form A  A 	A any formula

and cutfree provable means having a proof not containing an application of the cut
rule The sequent appearing at the root of the proof tree is called endsequent
Proposition  If a sequent is LBprovable then a nonempty subsequent is
provable without weakenings
Proof This is easily seen by induction on the length of the proof and is due to
the special formulation of the rules  
Example 	 We give an LBproof of the formula
 
 A   
 
A
A A
 A A
 left
 
 A
 
A
nex
A A
 A A
 left
 
 A
 
A
nex
 A
 
A
 left
 A  
 
A
nec
 
 A
 
 
 
A
nex
 
 A
 
 A  
 
A
 right
 
 A  
 
A
contrleft

 
 A   
 
A
right

Note that on the right branch of the proof we introduced  A twice on the left
hand side of a sequent This is necessary because of the way 	nex
 introduces
 
in
all formulas of the sequent
Theorem 
 LB is sound for TB ie every nite LBprovable sequent is valid
in TB
Proof It is sucient to prove the soundness of the LBrules The soundness of the
LKpart is proved as usual The soundness of the rules  left and  right follows
from the recursion equivalence of  A and
 
 A  A in the TBsemantics The
soundness of 	nex
 follows from Lemma 	
 and from the fact that
 
distributes
over the propositional connectives 	eg
 
	A B
 is equivalent to
 
A 
 
B
 The
soundness of 	nec
 follows from Lemma 	
 from the TBequivalence of  A and
  A from the distributivity of   over  and from the fact that  	A  B
 implies
 A   B  
If we look closely at the rules of LB we notice that 	 left
 and 	 right
 are
not strictly analytical Therefore it is convenient to extend the usual notion of
subformula Note that we have disjoint sets of free and bound variables A term
is dened as usual but subject to the restriction that it may only contain free
variables if also bound variables are allowed to occur we speak about semiterms
Similarly we distinguish between formulas and semiformulas The concept of strict
subsemiformula represents the intuitive notion of subformula while the denition
of semiformulas takes care about the nonanalytic behaviour of
 
and  
Denition  Let F be a formula The set ssf	F 
 of strict subsemiformulas
of F is dened as ssf	F 
  fFg 	F 
 where
	F 
 





fFg if F is atomic
ssf	A
 if F  	A for 	  f  
 
g
ssf	A
  ssf	B
 if F  A 	B for 	  fg
ssf	A	x

 if F  	Qx
A	x
 for Q  f g
The set sub	F 
 of subsemiformulas of F is dened by
sub	F 
  ssf	F 
  f
 
 A j  A  ssf	F 
g
By sub

	F 
 we denote the set of formulas obtained from sub	F 
 by replacing bound
variables without matching quantier in each member of sub	F 
 by free variables
or constant symbols 	ie we obtain actual subformulas corresponding to the semi
formulas

 Completeness of LB
The main result of this paper is the following theorem
Theorem  LB is complete for TB Every nite TBvalid sequent S has a cut
free LBproof from atomic axioms
The proof requires some additional denitions and technical lemmata In order
to emphasize the main lines of the argument we give a rough sketch of the proof in
advance
The proof uses a variant of Schuttes method of reduction trees as modied
for intuitionistic logic with Kripke semantics by  Ch  x  It proceeds by
exhibiting a countermodel for any given unprovable sequent in the following way
Let us assume that S   is unprovable We rst generate a reduction tree

by reverse application of all the rules of LB except nex and nec This tree
contains a branch B	S
 consisting of unprovable sequents only We form the union
sequent of B	S
 and extract from it the subsequent
 

B

 

B
consisting of all
formulas of the form
 
A By reverse application of 	nex
 we arrive at the sequent

B
 
B
 which is unprovable as well For this sequent we repeat the construction
of a reduction tree By iterating this procedure we obtain an innite sequence N of
reduction branches all of them containing unprovable sequents only Now we take
the union sequent of the sequence of all sequents contained in these branches In
turn we extract a subsequent  
N
  
N
consisting of all formulas of the form
 A but with the following restriction  A is in  
N
only if it occurs in innitely
many reduction branches of the sequence N  If  
N
is the empty sequence we have
completed our construction and obtain a countermodel otherwise we continue as
follows By construction  
N
  
N
is unprovable and so is any subsequent
of the form  
N
  A for any formula  A occurring in  
N
 We then repeat
the whole construction for all sequents  
N
 A 	note that these are unprovable
too
 This gives us a possibly innite and possibly innitary tree of innite chains
of reduction branches containing unprovable sequents only This tree is contained
in B and we obtain from it a countermodel for the original sequent S  
Denition  The reduction tree R	S
 of a sequent S   is an innite
innitary tree 	ie the nodes may be of innite degree
 st the set of nodes is a set
of 	occurrences of
 sequents R	S
 is dened in stages as follows
Stage  R

consists of S alone 	S is the root node of R	S


Stage k   Suppose that the reduction tree R
k
has already been constructed
In order to construct R
k 
we need some additional terminology Let B be a branch
	ie a maximal path starting from the root
 in R
k
 We call B closed if it is nite
and its end sequent    contains an atomic formula which is contained in both
 and  otherwise B is called open The free variables occurring in the sequents
of a branch B are called the available variables of B if there are none pick any free
variable and call it available Note that our sequents may be innite and thus there
may be innitely many free variables even on a nite branch Since in the denition
of R
k 
there may be nodes of uncountable degree we need an uncountable supply
of free variables 	note that this poses no problem as R	S
 is a semantic structure
and not an actual proof tree
 Constants occurring in S 	by construction no new
constants are generated
 are treated like available variables The reduction applies
to any top sequent 	ie leaf sequent
 of R
k
 The method is a generalization of
the rstorder case 	which applies to       
 by extending it to the
case of   For the time being we postpone treatment of
 
 Concerning formulas
with outermost logical symbols among        we proceed as in  We
present only some typical cases and omit most of the details The principle is that
of decomposing formulas according to their outermost logical symbol In order to
avoid reducing formulas more often than needed we mark formulas as treated
once the reduction has been applied to them
In the rst step the root sequent contains only unmarked formulas So let us
assume that S

   is a leaf node of a branch B in R
k

	a
 Outermost logical symbol  	left reduction

Let 	A
i
B
i


i
be the subsequence of  consisting of unmarked formulas with
outermost logical symbol  Then we dene S

 	A
i
 B
i


i
   and add
the edge 	S

 S


 to R
k
 Mark the thus reduced formulas 	A
i
B
i


i
in S


	a
 Outermost logical symbol  	right reduction

Here let 	A
i
 B
i


i
be the subsequence of  consisting of all unmarked for
mulas with outermost logical symbol  Let 	S


  f   	C
i


i
j C
i

A
i
or C
i
 B
i
g For every S

 	S


 add S

and the edge 	S

 S


 to R
k
and

mark the formulas 	A
i
B
i


i
therein Note that the node S

has an uncount
able degree in the new tree R
k 
if 	 is an innite ordinal
We skip the denition for the other propositional connectives and refer the reader
to 
	b
 Outermost logical symbol  	left reduction

Let
 
	x
i

A
i
	x
i



i
be the subsequence of  consisting of all unmarked for
mulas with outermost logical symbol  Let 	a
i


i
be a sequence consisting
of all free variables on the branch B from S to S

 Note that all sequents are
countable and the length of B is nite thus  is a countable ordinal again We
dene S


  
A
i
	a
j



j

i
   and add S

and the edge 	S

 S


 to R
k

	b
 Outermost logical symbol  	right reduction

Let
 
	x
i

A
i
	x
i



i
be the subsequence of  consisting of all unmarked for
mulas with outermost logical symbol  Create a sequence 	b
i


i
of free
variables which do not occur in any sequent constructed so far We dene
S

  
 
A
i
	b
i



i
and add S

and the edge 	S

 S


 to R
k
 Mark the
formulas 	x
i

A	x
i

 for i  	 in the consequent of the new sequent S


The construction for  is completely symmetric to the case of 
	c
 Outermost logical symbol   	left reduction

Let 	 A
i


i
be the subsequence of all formulas in  which are unmarked and
have   as outermost symbol Let S

 	A
i

 
 A
i


i
   and add S

and
the the edge 	S

 S


 to R
k
 Mark all formulas  A
i
for i  	 in  of S


Note that like in the other cases the form of S

is obtained by applying  left
backwards
	c
 Outermost logical symbol   	right reduction

Let 	 A
i


i
be the subsequence of all formulas in  which are unmarked and
have   as outermost logical symbol Let 	S


  f   	C
i


i
j C
i

A
i
or C
i

 
 A
i
g and add S

and the edge 	S

 S


 to R
k
for every S


	S


 Note that like in case 	a
 above the degree of the node S

in R
k 
is
uncountable provided 	 is innite Finally mark the formulas  A
i
for i  	 in
 of S


As already indicated we do not introduce reduction rules for
 
here Suppose none
of the reduction rules for       or   apply and the branch B 	from S to S



is open Then we simply add a copy S


of S

and the edge 	S

 S



 to R
k
 	Note that
we work with occurrences of sequents not merely sequents The reduction therefore
indeed produces a tree and not a cyclic graph

In order to guarantee that all formulas in the sequents are eventually processed
we postulate a clockwise order in reducing          If we take the
order as given we reduce   rst then  etc After having reduced   on all sequents
we start with   again Since reduced formulas in 	right
 	and 	left
 reductions
are not marked these formulas can be reduced innitely often Without postulating
such a clockwise order open branches would not dene countermodels in general
By the above construction we obtain an 	innite
 sequence of trees which is
monotonic Thus by taking the union over the sets of vertices and edges we obtain
the limit tree R

 R

is precisely the tree R	S
 we intended to construct
Note that our construction if applied to formulas neither containing
 
nor  
yields the familiar construction of a counterexample in classical predicate logic
Indeed if A is such a formula which is not valid 	in the standard rstorder se
mantics
 we obtain an innite open branch B representing a counterexample Our
construction however is not completed so far In fact we may obtain open branches

in R	S
 even for sequents valid in TB Note that in the construction of R	S
 itself
we cannot obtain innite sequents provided the root sequent is nite But in some
further constructions we will obtain innite sequents out of innite branches and
apply the method of reduction trees to these sequents as well Let us illustrate the
construction of R	S
 by a simple example 	cf also Example 

Example  Let S be 
 
 A   
 
A The tree R	S
 is given below






 
 A
 
 
 
A
 
 A
 
A
 
 
 A
 
 
 
A
 
 A
 
A
   right red 
 
 A 
 
A
   right red

 
 A   
 
A
R	S
 possesses two open innite branches As
 
 A   
 
A is TBvalid these
open branches do not represent counterexamples On the other hand we will prove
that for unprovable sequents there are always branches in the reduction tree con
taining unprovable sequents only Take for example S

  
 
A 
 
 A We already
know that S

is not TBvalid R	S


 is the following tree consisting of one innite
branch only



 
A
 
 
 
A
 
 A

 
A
 
 
 
A
 
 A
 	  right
 red
 
 
A
 
 A
 	  right
 red
 
 
A 
 
 A
It is easy to verify that the branch contains only sequents which are not valid in TB
Clearly by soundness of LB these sequents are all unprovable
In the case of LK nite sequents and an unprovable endsequent S we obtain a
tree R	S
 with the following property If S

is an unprovable sequent in R	S
 then
there is a successor of S

in R	S
 which is also unprovable As R	S
 must be innite
and its node degree nite there is an innite branch by Konigs LemmaThis innite
branch consist of unprovable sequents only and represents a counterexample This
argument obviously yields the completeness of LK
In the case of innite sequents S there may be nodes in R	S
 of uncountable
degree This phenomenon occurs if in a sequent S

occurring in R	S
 we have
innitely many formulas containing an outermost logical operator with a binary
reduction rule 	eg 	right
 or 	 right

 It is however still possible to prove the
existence of an innite branch containing unprovable sequents For this purpose we
will use a generalization of Konigs Lemma due to Takeuti 
Denition  Let 	 be a set and fW
i
g
i
be a family of sets indexed by 	
If f 
Q
i
 
W
i
and 	
 
 	 then f is called a partial function over 	 with
domain domf  	
 
 If domf  	 then f is called total If f and g are partial
functions st dom f  D

 domg and f	x
  g	x
 for all x  D

 then we call g
an extension of f and write f  g and f  g j
n
D



Theorem  	Takeuti  p f
 Let 	 be a set and fW
i
g
i
be a family of
nite sets Let P be a property of partial functions over 	 st
 P 	f
 holds i there exists a nite subset N  	 st P 	f j
n
N 
 holds
 P 	f
 holds for every total f 
Then there exists a nite subset N

 	 st P 	f
 holds for every f with N

 domf 
Lemma 	 Let R	S
 be the reduction tree of a possibly innite unprovable se
quent S Then R	S
 has a branch B	S
 containing unprovable sequents only Such
a branch is called a reduction branch of R	S

Proof We have to show that in R	S
 a sequent S

is unprovable i there exists
a successor S

of S

st S

is unprovable Equivalently
	
 If all successors of a sequent node S

are provable then S

itself is provable
Using transnite induction on trees 	by ordering trees according to the standard
subset relation
 we derive from 	
 If S is unprovable then there exists an in
nite reduction branch in R	S
 	every maximal nite branch must end in a provable
sequent
 Thus by 	
 every path leading to an unprovable sequent can be ex
tended
 Note again that the degree of some nodes in R	S
 may be uncountable
but branches in R	S
 are always countable Thus it remains to prove 	

Case  S

is of degree  The rule used for the reduction of S

has only one
premise eg 	right
 	left
 	 left
 Then S

has only one successor S

 Let us
assume that S

is provable By denition of provability 	of innite sequents
 there
exists a nite subsequent S


of S

which is provable too Now let B
 
     B
m
be
the formulas in S


obtained by reduction using some rule 	let us call it 
 Then
by repeated application of  on the B
i
combined with contractions and exchanges
we obtain a nite subsequent S


of S

which is provable too the proof of S


can be
easily extended to a proof of S



Case  S

is of degree   	possibly of uncountable degree
 The rule corre
sponding the reduction of this node must be binary  eg 	left
 	 right
 By
denition of a reduction tree the successors of S

must be of the form
   	C
j
i
i


i
or 	C
j
i
i


i
  
where for all i  	 we have j
i
 f g depending on which 	of the two
 subformulas
occurs on position i Moreover for every sequence 	j
i


i
there exists a successor
corresponding to this sequence In the argument to follow it does not matter whether
the rule under consideration is a left or a right rule Thus we restrict attention to
the case where  is a right rule and the reduced sequent is    	C
j
i
i


i

Now let W
i
 f g for every i  	 and f denote functions in
Q
i
W
i
	
f g


 Let us assume that all successors of S

are provable Then to every suc
cessor S

of S

there corresponds exactly one f  f g

 Thus if S

corresponds
to f we write S

 S

f  Since S

f  is provable there exists a nite subsequent
S


f  of S

f  which is provable too This means for every total f 	see Deni
tion 
 there is a nite subsequent S


f  of S

f  st S


f  is provable Hence for
S

    	C
j
i
i


i
and every f  f g

we obtain a nite provable subse
quent S


f  of the form

f
 
f
 	C
j
i
i


i
 
where 	
 
is a nite subset of 	
Let 	
 
 fi
 
     i
n
g be an arbitrary nite subset of 	 and let f  f g

 

Then we call the nite sequence of formulas
 
C
fi
 
i
 
     C
fi
n
i
n


selected for f if there are nite subsequences 
f
 
f
of  respectively st
f


f
 	C
fii


i
 
is provable By the explications above there are such subsequences
for every f  Hence there exist selected sequences for every total f 
In order to apply Takeutis theorem we have to dene a property P of partial
functions over R We choose
P 	f
  	n  
	i
 
     i
n
 domf
	C
fi
 
i
 
     C
fi
n
i
n

 is selected
P 	f
 obviously satises both conditions 	
 and 	
 of Theorem  Thus Takeutis
theorem applies and there exists a nite set 	

 fr
 
     r

g  	 st if 	

 domf
then P 	f
 holds We dene
F  ff j domf  	

g
Then F is a nite set and P 	f
 holds for all f  F  But this means that for
every f  F there exists s
 
     s
k
 R

	 domf
 st
 
C
fs
 
s
 
     C
fs
k
s
k

is
selected ie there exists a nite subsequence 
f
 
f
of  st

f
 
f
 C
fs
 
s
 
     C
fs
k
s
k
is provable Now the set f g


is isomorphic to f g
f g
 the set of all binary
sequences of length  Thus for every such binary sequence   	i
 
     i


 there
exist nite subsequences 

 

of  st
S



 

 C
i
 
r
 
     C
i

r

is provable We see that the C
i
 
r
 
     C
i

r

for 	i
 
     i


  f g
f g
	
B


 are exactly the reduction formulas obtained from the reduction of the nite
subsequent S




 

 C
r
 
     C
r

where 

is the union sequence of 	



B

and 

is the union sequence of 	



B

 By repeated application of the binary
rule  under consideration we can derive S


from the sequents S

 Together with
the respective LBproofs of the S

we obtain a proof of S


 But S


is a nite
subsequence of S

and thus S

is provable  
Note that in order to prove lemma  we made use of the compactness of the
provability concept 	which holds by denition
 We did not use 	semantic
 com
pactness of the logic TB and do not even claim that TB is indeed compact
So far we know that for unprovable sequents S there must be an innite branch
containing only unprovable sequents 	ie a reduction branch
 in R	S
 In our next
step we pass the ordinal  in our construction and obtain innite sequents out of
nite ones 	note that if S is nite then R	S
 contains only nite sequents
 The
basic idea is to construct 	innite
 unprovable sequents out of reduction branches
and iterate this procedure innitely often
Denition 
 Let S be an unprovable sequent and B be a reduction branch
in R	S
 Let S

be the union sequent of B 	see Denition 
 and S


 	
 
A
i


i

	
 
B
j


j
be the subsequent of S

consisting of all formulas in S

with outermost
logical symbol
 
 Let S


be 	A
i


i
 	B
j


j
	This is the sequent S


stripped
of its outermost
 
s
 Then S


is called the successor of S wrt B
Lemma  Let S be an unprovable sequent and B be a reduction branch in R	S

and let S

be the successor of S wrt B Then S

is unprovable
Remark  By lemma  we know that R	S
 must have a reduction branch thus
the assumption of the lemma can always be fullled and S

exists

Proof Let S

be 	A
i


i
 	B
j


j
 Assume by way of contradiction that S

is
provable By denition of provability there is a nite subsequent S

A
i
 
     A
i
k

B
j
 
     B
j

of S

which is LBprovable But from S

we can derive 	in one step

using 	nex
 the sequent S

 

 
A
i
 
    
 
A
i
k

 
B
j
 
    
 
B
j

 Since S

is the
successor of S wrt B by Denition  S

 
is a nite subsequent of the union
sequent U 	B
 of B Thus if B  	S
i


i
there exists a nite initial segment B


	S
 
     S
n

 of B with S
 
 S and so that the union sequent U 	B


 of B

contains
S

 
 Let left	  
 denote the set of all formulas in  and right	  
 denote
the set of all formulas in  By construction of R	S
 we have that left	S
i

  left	S
j


and right	S
i

  right	S
j

 for   i  j  n Hence left	U 	B



  left	S
n

 and
right	U 	B



  right	S
n

 In other words S

 
is a nite subsequent of S
n
 S

 
is
provable and thus S
n
is provable too But this is impossible because S is a reduction
branch Hence S

must be unprovable  
Denition  Let S
 
be an unprovable sequent A nexttime sequence is an
innite sequence of reduction branches 	B
i


i
st B
 
is a reduction branch of S
 

and for every i   B
i
is a reduction branch of a successor S
i
of S
i 
wrt B
i 

All variables occurring in B
i
are available for the construction of B
i 
	ie for the
reductions left and right

Note that by Lemma  nexttime sequences exist for all unprovable sequents
This is easily seen by induction
Example  We construct a nexttime sequence N 	S
 

 corresponding to the
sequent S 
 
A
 
 A The following sequence is a reduction branch in R	S
 


B
 
S
 

 
A
 
 
 
A 
 
A
 
 A
 
A
 
 
 
A 
 
A
 
 A   
The union sequent of B
 
is
 
A
 
 
 
A 
 
A 
 
 A Therefore the successor of
S
 
wrt B
 
is
S

A 
 
A  A
For S

we obtain a reduction branch of the form
B

S

A 
 
A
 
 A
 
A
 
 
 
AA 
 
A
 
 A   
with the union sequent
 
A
 
 
 
AA 
 
A
 
 A The successor of S

wrt B

is
S

 S

 A 
 
A  A
In general S
i
 S

 A 
 
A  A and B
i
 B

for i  
The sequents in a nexttime sequence represent necessary conditions for a se
quent S to be true If S is true at time point  then S
 
is true at point  S

at  etc
But these conditions are not sucient Let us look at the sequent S
 
 
 
A
 
 A
We know that S
 
is not TBvalid Let us assume that S
 
is true at time point 
Then the sequent S

A 
 
A  A is true at time point  and at time k we would
have A 
 
A   A being true According to our semantics there is a counterex
ample to the sequent S

at every time point k   But recall that at time point 
we may set A to false Note that  is not a successor ordinal Thus in order to
construct counterexamples to sequents we have to jump across time gaps this
jump will be performed via reverse application of the necessitation rule
Denition  Let S be an unprovable sequent A gapjump tree G	S
 for S is a
tree with nodes consisting of nexttime sequences satisfying the following conditions
	
 The root of G	S
 is a nexttime sequence of S

	
 Let N be a nexttime sequence in G	S
 corresponding to a sequent S

 Then
	NN
i

 i  	 are edges in G	S
 if the N
i
are constructed as follows
Let N  	B
i


i
and 

 

be the union sequent of N 	ie 

 

is the
union sequent of the union sequents of the B
i

 Let  
N
be the subsequence of
all formulas in 

with outermost logical symbol    
N
is a subsequence of 

obtained in the following way delete all formulas in 

except formulas of the
form  A where  A occurs in the right hand sides of innitely many successor
sequents in N  Thus we obtain a sequent of the form
 
N
  
N
  
N
 	 A
i


i
and dene a nexttime sequence N
i
for every  
N
 A
i
	i  	
 provided
 
N
 A
i
is unprovable
If  
N
is empty then N is a leaf in G	S

In the denition of the nexttime sequence N
i
all free variables available for the
construction of N are available for the construction of N
i
too 	for the left and
right reduction in the reduction branches

If  
N
is empty then according to denition  the node corresponding to N
must be a leaf But even if  
N
is nonempty it might be the case that the sequents
 
N
 A
i
are provable and thus do not dene new nexttime sequences We will
see in Lemma  that such a case cannot occur
Example  We construct a gapjump tree with root N 	S
 

 where N 	S
 

 is the
nexttime sequence of Example  For N  	B
i


i 
we had B
i
 B

for i  
and
B

A 
 
A  AA 
 
A
 
 A
 
A
 
 
 
AA 
 
A
 
 A   
B
 
starts with  
 
A
 
 A so we obtain as union sequent of N 
 
 
AA
 
A
 
 
 
A 
 
A     A
 
 A   
where formulas 	if we do not use contraction
 may be repeated innitely many times
Note that in all the successors S
i 
wrt B
i
we have S
i 
 A 
 
A   A for
i   and thus  A occurs innitely often on the right side Hence  
N
  
N

 
 
A   A We have to consider only the single sequent S

 
 
A A The only
edge leaving N 	S
 

 in G	S
 

 is 	N 	S
 

 N 	S



 A nexttime sequence N 	S


 for
S

is easily obtained We construct the reduction tree for S

and nd a reduction
branch B

with successor sequent S

A 
 
A  It is immediately clear that the
successor sequents will be repeated innitely often A nexttime sequence for S

is
N 	S


  	B
i


i
where
B

  
 
A A
 
A
 
 
 
A 
 
A A   
B
 
 A 
 
A
 
A
 
 AA 
 
A   
B
i
 B
 
for all i  
N 	S


 is a leaf node of the gapjump tree since there is no formula of the form  A
occurring in innitely many successor sequents on the right hand side 	in fact there
are no such formulas at all

In dening the gapjump tree we have constructed a sequent of the form
S

 
N
  
N
where  
N
contains only formulas appearing innitely many
times S

can be extracted from the nexttime sequence N  which is also a node
in the tree If the consequent of S

is empty then clearly N is a leaf in the gapjump
tree Otherwise we obtain sequents of the form  
N
 A
i
 where  A
i
occurs
in  
N
 We call S

the  extract of N and every sequent S

 
N
 A for  A
in  
N
a right reduct of S

 	The term right reduct should not be confused with
the 	 right
 reduction of S

 which has a dierent form


Lemma  Let N be a node in a gapjump tree G	S


 for unprovable S

and S
be the  extract of N  If the consequent of S is not empty then every right reduct
of S is unprovable
Remark  A consequence of this lemma is that every right reduct denes a
nexttime sequence and thus a successor node of N 
Proof Let S 
N
  
N
be the  extract of N st  
N
is not empty and let
 A be a formula in  
N

Assume by way of contradiction that S

 
N
 A is provable By denition
of provability there is a nite subsequent S

 

N
 

N
of S

st S

is provable


N
is either empty or A alone
If 

N
is empty then S

is a subsequent of the union sequent of N 	recall that N is
a nexttime sequence
 We show that there exists a successor sequent S
i
of a branch
B
i 
in N st  

N
is a subsequence of the antecedent of S
i
 Let  C be a formula
in  

N
  C occurs in some sequent S
C
in a reduction branch B in N  By denition
of a reduction branch
 
 C must occur in almost all descendents of S
C
and thus
also in the union sequent 		 left
 reduction
 By denition of a successor sequent
the successor wrtB must contain  C in the antecedent Moreover  C must occur
in all further successor sequents in N  As  

N
is a nite sequence there must be
a successor sequent S
j
of a reduction branch B
j 
st  

N
is subsequence of the
antecedent of S
j
 But then S
j
would be provable which contradicts Lemma 
If 

N
 A then like in the case where 

N
is empty above we obtain a successor
sequent S
i
in N st  

N
is a subsequence of the antecedent of S
i
 By denition
of a  extract the formula  A must occur in innitely many S
j
s Observe that
 

N
is a subsequent of the antecedents of all S
j
for j  i Therefore there must
be a k st  

N
  A is a subsequent of S
k
 If S

 

N
 A is as we assumed
provable then so is S

 

N
  A by application of the rule 	nec
 Since S

is a
subsequent of S
k
 S
k
were provable too again contradicting Lemma   
Corollary 	 If N is a leaf in a gapjump tree then the consequent of the  
extract of N is empty
Proof Assume that the  extract S of N were not empty Then S would have
right reducts Any such right reduct S

is unprovable by Lemma  But then
there would be a nexttime sequence N 	S


 for S

and and an edge 	NN 	S



  
Proof of the Completeness Theorem 
We have to show that nite unprovable sequents are not valid More precisely if S is
a nite sequent which is unprovable in LB then there exists a TBinterpretation K
for S which falsies S
Let G	S
 be a gapjump tree for S We dene the following TBinterpretation
K  hT fD
B
g
BT
 fS
B
g
BT
i where
	
 T is the set of all occurrences of reduction branches 	in the nexttime sequences

in G	S
 For the remaining part of this proof we use the letter B for occurrences
of branches and
 
B for the branch corresponding to B Moreover we introduce
the following partial order
If B and B

are two occurrences within the same nexttime sequence 	
i


i
then there are i j   st
 
B  
i
and
 
B

 
j
 We set B  B

if i  j and
B

 B if j  i Clearly B  B

for i  j
If BB

are occurrences in dierent nexttime sequences N  N

	which are nodes
of G	S

 then B  B

i there is a path from N to N

in G	S
 Evidently the
order type of  is in T 

	
 For every B  T  D
B
is the set of all free variables V 	B
 occurring in
 
B Note
that by the denitions of a nexttime sequence 	
 and of a gapjump tree
	
 V 	B
  V 	B


 if B  B

 Thus we obtainD
B
 D
B
 
for B  B

	second
condition of Denition 

	
 Denition of the evaluation function S
B
for B  T 
Set S
B
	a
  a for a  D
B
	note that elements of D
B
are available as constant
symbols in the extended language
 IfA is an atomic formulawe dene S
B
	A
 
 if A occurs in the antecedent of a sequent occurring in B and   otherwise
We have to show that this truth assignment is consistent ie that it is impossible
that an atomic formulaA occurs in an antecedent and in a consequent of a sequent
in B Thus let B  	S
i


i
 By construction of a reduction tree we have sub

	S
i

 
sub

	S
j

 for i  j 	see denition 
 In particular all atomic formulas occurring in
the antecedent 	consequent
 of S
i
also occur in the antecedent 	consequent
 of S
j

Thus if A occurs in the antecedent of S
i
and in the consequent of S
j
it must occur
in both sides in S
k
for k  max	i j
 This however contradicts the denition of
reduction branches in a reduction tree 	Denition 
 as B would be closed So
S
B
is consistently dened
It remains to show that K as dened above is indeed a countermodel to S
It suces to show the following 		
 If F is a formula occurring in the antecedent
	consequent
 of a sequent in a reduction branch
 
B 	in a nexttime sequence N oc
curring as a node in G	S

 then K
B
	F 
   	K
B
	F 
  
 Then by Denition 
and by the niteness of S 	the implication corresponding to
 S is falsied in K as
K
B

	S
   	B

being the rst reduction branch in the root of G	S

 Note that
F cannot occur in an antecedent of S and in a consequent of S

for two sequents
S S

in B The reasons are the same as for atomic formulas described above We
prove 		
 by induction on the logical complexity of F 
If F is an atomic formula 	logical complexity 
 then 		
 follows fromK
B
	F 
 
S
B
	F 
 and the denition of S
B
 Suppose that 	
 has been shown for all formulas
of logical complexity  n Let F be a formula of logical complexity n   If the
outermost logical symbol is not a temporal operator 	 
 

 then the reduction to
the case  n follows exactly the classical rstorder case 	see  Ch  x 
 It
remains to handle the cases F   F

and F 
 
F

for some formula F


	
 F 
 
F


Let us assume that F occurs in the antecedent 	consequent
 of a reduction
branch B Because B is a branch in a nexttime sequence there is a succes
sor S

wrt B 	see Denition 
 on which the next reduction branch starts
	see Denition 
 By denition of successor F

occurs in the antecedent
	consequent
 of S

 which is the rst sequent of the successor branch B

 By
the induction hypothesis K
B
 
	F


   	K
B
 
	F


  
 By Denition 
K
B
	F 
  K
B
	
 
F


  K
B
 
	F


 As F must occur on the same side as F

we
conclude that 		
 holds for F 
	
 F   F


	a
 F occurs in the antecedent of a sequent in a reduction branch B in the
nexttime sequence N 
By the semantics of   we haveK
B
	F 
   i for all B

st B  B

it holds
that K
B
 
	F


   So let us assume that F occurs in the antecedent of the
sequent S
i
in B Then
 
 F

must occur in 	the antecedent of
 a sequent S
j
for some j  i By denition of a nexttime sequence N   F

must occur
in 	the antecedent of
 the successor of B By induction  F

occurs in the
antecedent of every sequent in every reduction branch in this nexttime
sequence Hence  F

occurs in the union  

and in the antecedent of the
 extract of N  By denition of right reducts and the gapjump tree then

 F

also occurs in the antecedents of all 	initial
 reduction branches in the
successor nodes N

of N in G	S
 By the same arguments as before we
have that  F

occurs in the antecedent of every sequent in every reduction
branch B

 B Every reduction branch containing  F

in the antecedent
of some sequent also contains F

in the antecedent of some sequent 	by
	 left
 reduction
 Hence by the induction hypothesis K
B
 
	F


   for
all B

 B and therefore K
B
	F 
  
	b
 F occurs in the consequent of a sequent in a reduction branch B in the
nexttime sequence N 
By denition of 	 right
 reduction  which is binary there is a sequent in B
which either contains 	in the consequent
 F

or
 
 F

 In the former case we
have immediately by the induction hypothesis thatK
B
	F


   and hence
K
B
	F 
   Otherwise observe that the successor of B contains  F

in the
consequent We have two cases 	i
 either all reduction branches  B in N
contain
 
 F

 or 	ii
 some branch B

contains F

in the consequent of some
sequent The former holds if at every 	 right
 reduction of F in N the right
premise lies on the reduction branch the latter if in some reduction the left
premise does Case 	ii
 is handled as above For case 	i
 observe that  F

occurs 	in the consequent of
 every successor sequent of branches B

 B
in N  Thus by denition of the  extract  
N
  
N
of N   F

belongs
to  
N
 Then there is some right reduct of N of the form  
N
 F

 By
Lemma  this right reduct is unprovable and thus is the initial sequent of
the rst reduction branch B

of some successor node N

of N in G	S
 By
the induction hypothesis K
B
 
	F


   Since B  B

the semantics of  
gives us K
B
	 F


  
This concludes the proof of 		
 and we have shown that K falsies S  
Remark  If the original sequents may be innite in particular of unbounded
logical complexity then we no longer have a wellfounded ordering on the sequents
On the other hand the reduction steps which yield innite sequents in the proof
keep the logical complexity of formulas occurring in the sequents bounded Hence
if the starting sequent is of bounded logical complexity 	in particular if it is nite

we have a wellfounded order Otherwise the induction proof is problematic
 TL versus TB
It should be interesting to compare the two logics TL and TB A comparison
from the viewpoint of expressibility would clarify the possible application of TB
in a program specication and verication environment Such an analysis however
would go beyond the scope of the present article An analysis from a logical point
of view can be given more easily Here the comparison centers around the induction
rule in propositional TL 	see 

A B A
 
A
A  B
ind
and the weaker necessitation rule of TB
Proposition   The propositional fragment of TB is decidable
 The fragment of TB without
 
is equal to S
	 The monadic fragments of TL and TB are undecidable
 The fragment of TB without   is axiomatizable by LK plus nex
 The fragment of TB without   is equal to the fragment of TL without  

Proof 	
 sub

	  
 is nite 	
 LB without
 
collapses to the sequent
calculus for S given in  	
 Follows from the undecidability of monadic modal
predicate logic see below 	
 A cutfree proof can contain 	 left
 	 right
 or
	nec
 only if   occurs in the endsequent 	
 By 	
 a proof has to be found before
jumping over the rst gap i one exists  
In contrast to 	
 above the monadic fragment of TB without   	and hence
by 	
 the fragment of TL without  
 is decidable
Proposition  It is decidable if a monadic temporal formula containing no  s
is satisable
Proof Note that
 
distributes over all propositional connectives Hence any
formula F containing no  s is equivalent to a formula of the form
W
j
K
j
where
K
j

	
k
E
j
k

	
l
A
j
l
E
j
k

 
e
k
	x

	
i
 
e
 
ik
L
ik
	x

A
j
l

 
a
l
	x



i
 
a
 
il
L
il
	x

where L
i
jk
is a negated or unnegated atomic formula F is satisable i K
j
is sat
isable for some j Consider the set  	K
  
 
	K
  

	K
 with

 
	K
  f
	
i
 
e
k
e
 
ik
L
ik
	t
k

 j kg


	K
  f


i
 
a
l
a
 
il
L
il
	t
k

 j l k e
k
 a
l
g
where t
k
are constant symbols and
 
v
L
ik
	t
l

 is considered as a propositional literal
L
v
ikl
 K is satisable i  	K
 is satisable in classical propositional logic  
So already the monadic fragments containing   but not
 
are undecidable
It is worth to recapitulate the construction of the proof of Kripke  A binary
predicate P 	x y
 can be encoded in monadic temporal logic as P

	x y
  	P
 
	x

P

	y

 Let F be a formula in the language of predicate logic and F

be obtained
from it by replacing nary predicates P 	x
 
     x
n

 by 	P
 
	x
 

  P
n
	x
n


 If F
is valid then F

is too it being a substitution instance of F  If F is not valid then
we construct a temporal countermodel for F

 Let M be a 	rstorder
 structure in
which F is not satised By the LowenheimSkolem Theorem we can assumeM to
be countable We can enumerate all ntuples of elements of the domainM using a
function e Let T be  and S
j
	P
i

  fag i a is the ith component of the jth
	in e
 ntuple ofM  So 	P
 
	a
 

  P
n
	a
n


 is true in h fD
i
 Mg
i
 fS
i
g
i
i
i M j P 	a
 
     a
n


As remarked above the undecidability of the monadic fragments of TL and TB
follows from the undecidability of dyadic predicate logic and the above construc
tion We have two immediate consequences First the monadic fragment of TL
	with
 

 is not even axiomatizable since we can replace the function symbols 

  
 by 	a unary a binary and two ternary
 predicate symbols These predicate
symbols can in turn be replaced by temporal constructions of the kind used above
so nonaxiomatizability follows from the nonaxiomatizability of the full logic 	see
Section 
 A second interesting consequence is that already the fragment with only
one monadic predicate symbol 	but including
 

 is undecidable With some adjust
ment to the construction of the countermodel in the proof above a binary predicate

can also be encoded by 	P 	x
 
 
P 	y

 We do not know however whether the
corresponding fragment of TL is still not axiomatizable
Even without a deep analysis it is obvious that propositional TL is decidable by
embedding it into the the monadic second order logic of one successor of Buchi 
	A decision method based on a similar reduction method as the one used here forTB
can be found in 
 For the same reason the quantied propositional variant of TL
is decidable We do not know whether quantied propositionalTB is decidable Note
that even though propositional TB 
 
equals S the propositionally quantied
logics dier Hence the result of Kremer  III ie that propositional S is
recursively isomorphic to secondorder logic is of no help here We conjecture
however that quantied propositionalTB is not axiomatizable as well In summary
we have the following situation
TL TB
propositional decidable decidable
monadic w!o   equal and decidable
monadic not axiomatizable undecidable
quantied propositional decidable not axiomatizable"
full rstorder not axiomatizable axiomatizable
 Resolution for TB
A practical consequence of the cutfree completeness of LB is the ability to construct
a resolution calculus The exact relationship between cutfree proofs in sequent
calculus and resolution proofs has been investigated at length by Mints   This
relationship is also the starting point for very fruitful investigations into resolution
systems and strategies for other nonclassical logics eg linear logic 	see 

The resolution procedure for TB works as follows The formula F to be proved
	 F to be refuted
 is translated to clause form via translation rules based on the
calculus LB The translation is structure preserving and the literals have the form
	 
A	a
 
     a
n

 where A is the subsemiformula corresponding to this literal
and a
 
     a
n
are free variables or constant symbols A clause is an expression of
the form C where C is a set of literals A clause may carry a variable restriction
denoted C
a
 meaning that a resolution involving C is only allowed if a does not
occur in the resulting clause and if a is not substituted into The rules are the
resolution and factoring rules plus two rules corresponding to the 	nec
 and 	nex

rules By Lemma  and replacement of free variables with constant symbols we
can assume that F is closed and does not start with   or
 

Denition 	 Let F be a semiformula and let 	
 
     	
n
be all the constant
symbols and bound variables without matching quantier in order of occurrence
Then the code of F is dened as F 		
 
     	
n

 where F  is an nary predicate
symbol and  is a canonical renaming mapping 	
 
     	
n
to new free variables
The axiom set Ax 	F 
 is dened as the smallest set satisfying the following Let
P 		
 
     	
n

 and P 	
 
     
n

 be two atomic subsemiformulas of F with the
same predicate symbol Then
the clause f P 	 	
	
 
     
n

 P 	
 

	
 
     
n

g  Ax 	F 
 where 
i
 	
i

with  the renaming as above and  a most general unier of 		
 
     	
n

 and
	
 
     
n


The clause translation Cl	F 
 is the following set of clauses Cl	F 
 
S
fC
F
	A
 j
A  sub	F 
g  Ax 	F 
 

f F 		
 
     	
n
g

 where C
F
	A
 is given by the
following table

A occurrence C
F
	A

 B pos

fB  Bg

 B neg

f B  Bg

B C pos

f B C B Cg

B C neg

fB B  Cg fC B Cg

B C pos

f B B  Cg f C B Cg

B C neg

fB C B Cg

B  C pos

fB B  Cg f C B  Cg

B  C neg

f B C B  Cg

	x
B pos

f B	x
	a
 	x
B	x
g
a

	x
B neg

fB	x
	a
 	x
B	x
g

	x
B pos

f B	a
 	x
B	x
g

	x
B neg

fB	a
 	x
B	x
g
a



 B pos

f B 
 
 B  Bg

 B neg

fB  Bg ff
 
 B  Bg

Here a stands for x in the code for A	x
  is the same for all literals in a clause
in C
F
	A
 and positive and negative occurrences are dened as usual
Note that there are no translation rules for formulas with outermost symbol
 

just as there are no introduction rules 	without restrictions
 for
 
in LB This is
clear since there is no relation between A and
 
A which depends only on A
Denition 	 The degree deg	A
 of a semiformula A is the number of occur
rences of logical symbols except   and
 
in A The degree of a clause is
deg	C
 

 if C  
maxfdeg	A
 j A  C or  A  Cg otherwise
Note that maxfdeg	A
 j A  	sub	F 
 n fFg
g  deg	F 
 since F is assumed to be
prexfree 	see the comments above

The resolution calculus for TB consists of the the following rules
C  fA	a
 
     a
n

 A	b
 
     b
n

g
C  fA	a
 
     a
n

g
fact
C  f A	a
 
     a
n

g C

 fA	b
 
     b
n

g
 
C n f A	a
 
     a
n

g

 
 
C

n fA	b
 
     b
n

g


res
where  is the most general unier of 	a
 
     a
n

 and 	b
 
     b
n

 and it is assumed
that the resolved clauses are variable disjoint 	ie by renaming variables
 The
resolution rule is subject to the following restrictions
	
 deg	C C


  min
 
deg	C  f Ag
 deg	C

 fAg


	
 if one of the two resolved clauses is restricted on the variable a then 	a
  a
and a does not occur in
 
C n f A	a
 
     a
n

g

 
 
C

n fA	b
 
     b
n

g


f A
 
     A
 
 B
 
     B
 
g
a
f 
 
A
 
     
 
A
 
 
 
B
 
     
 
B
 
g
a
nex
r
f  A
 
      A
 
 Bg
f  A
 
      A
 
  Bg
nec
r
The application of the rules 	nex
r

 and 	nec
r

 is restricted so that the resulting
literals are still within sub	F 
 The calculus therefore depends on F  we actually
are giving a construction schema for resolution calculi for each F 
The following should be noted about the variable restriction

Proposition 	 In any resolution inference
a there is never a restriction on more than one variable in any one clause and
b at most one of the two premises carries a restriction
Proof 	a
 Resolution removes all restricted variables 	condition 	
 above
 from
the resolvent and the property holds of all input clauses
	b
 First of all restricted clauses are input clauses in Cl	F 
 corresponding to
positive occurrences of  or negative occurrences of  	or are derived from them
by applications of 	nex
r

 but not using other rules cf 	a

 A resolution inference
with two premises which both carry restrictions would be 	up to leading
 
s
 of the
form
f A	x
	a b  c
 	x
A	x
g
a
fA	x


	b

 a

  c


 	x


A	x


g
a
 
f	x
A	x
 	x


A	x


g
res
Other constellations are ruled out by the degree restriction on resolution Since
neither a nor a

may be substituted into by the unier  they cannot stand opposite
each other Instead they must unify with two other variables b

and b respectively
ie 	b


  a and 	b
  a

 But then the restricted variables would occur in the
resulting clause violating condition 	
 of resolution  
Example 	 Consider the formula  
 
	x
A	x
  	x
 
 
A	x
 The subsemi
formulas are
S
 
 A	x
 S


 
A	x

S


 
 
 
A	x
 S

  
 
A	x

S
	
 	x
 
 
A	x
 S


 	x
A	x

S


 
 
 
	x
A	x
 S


 
	x
A	x

S

  
 
	x
A	x
 S
 
  
 
	x
A	x
  	x
 
 
A	x

A resolution proof is given by
fS

  S
 
g
fS

 S

g
fS

  S
 
 ag
fS

  S

 ag
nex
r
fS

  S

 ag
res
fS

  S

 ag
nec
r
fS

 b S

g
b
fS

 S

g
res
fS

 S
 
g
res
fS

  S
 
g
fS
 
g
res
fS
 
g

res
Example 	 By contrast consider the formula F  P 	f
  	x
P 	x
 which is
not valid Without the eigenvariable condition we would have the following deriva
tion of the empty clause
fF  eg
fP x a  	xP xg
a
fP x bP c bg fP c b F  bg
fP x b F  bg
res
f 	xP x F  bg
res

f 	xP x F  dg
fF  bg
res

res
For the resolution step 	res


 to work either 	a
  b or 	b
  a The former
case is expressly forbidden in the latter case the restricted variable would appear
in the resulting clause
Theorem 		 The resolution calculus for TB is sound If  is derivable from
Cl	F 
 then j F 

Proof We show how a resolution derivation  not using the goal clause f F g
can be translated to an LBderivation Associate to each clause C in  the
substitution 
C
  where  is the original renaming of the bound vari
ables and constants in subsemiformulas of F whose code occurs in C and  is
the cumulative substitution of the subderivation in  ending in C In eect if
A	x
	a
 is a literal in C then A	x

C
is the formula A	a
 If  ends in a clause
C f A
 
	 a
 

     A
n
	 a
n

 B
 
	
 
b
 

     B
m
	
 
b
m

g we obtain an LBproof of
S
C
A

 

C
     A

n

C
 B

 

C
     B

m

C
 If C carries a variable restriction the
restricted variable is bound by a weak quantier in S
C
 We argue by induction on
the length of 
h    consists of a clause C from Cl	F 
 n f F g only If C  Ax 	F 
 say
C  f P 	 	
	 a
 P 	
 

	 a
g the sequent P 	 a
 P 	 a
 is the corresponding axiom
If C  C
F
	A
 where A  sub	F 
 then we construct an LBproof of S
C
 We present
here only some cases
	
 C 

f A B A Bg

 The corresponding proof is
A A B  B
AB  A B
right
	
 C 

f A	x
	a
 	x
A	x
g
a

 The corresponding proof is
	x
A	x
 	x
A	x

	
 C 

fA	x
	a
 	x
A	x
g

 The corresponding proof is
A	a
 A	a

	x
A	x
 A	a

left
	
 C  ff
 
 A  Ag The corresponding proof is
 
 A
 
 A
 A
 
 A
 left
h   We distinguish cases according to the last inference in  Let N denote
the negative and P the positive set of literals in a clause and 
N
and 
P
its
translations respectively
	
 The last inference in  is a resolution where the premises do not carry a variable
restriction
C N  P  fA	 a
g C

 N

 P

 f A	
 
b
g
 N   N

  P  P


res
By induction hypothesis we have LBproofs  

of 
N
 
P
 A
C
	 a
 and
A
C
 
	
 
b

N
 
 
P
 
 The unier  does not substitute into eigenvariables of 
or 

 We obtain a proof






N
  
P
A	 a








A	
 
b

N
 
  
P
 


N

N
 
  
P

N
 

cut
	
 The last inference in  is a resolution where one premise contains the restricted
variable a
 N P  fA	a
g
a
 N

 P

 f A	b
g
 N   N

  P  P


res
By Proposition  a resolution involving restricted variables can only take this
form By induction hypothesis we have LBproofs  

of 
N
 
P
 A	a


and 	x
A	x

N
 
 
P
 
 The unier  does not substitute into restricted
variables 	ie eigenvariables of  


 Since a is restricted we have 	a
  a
and 	b
  a so b cannot occur in the resulting clause Hence it satises the
eigenvariable condition We obtain a proof






N
  
P
A	b


N
 
P
 	x
A	x

right







	x
A	x

N
 
  
P
 


N

N
 
  
P

P
 

cut
	
 The last inference in  is 	fact

 N  P  f	 
A	 a
 	 
A	
 
b
g
 N N  f	 
A	 a
g
fact
By induction hypothesis we have a proof  of 
N
 
P
 A	 a
 A	
 
b
 	or
A	 a
 A	
 
b

N
 
P

 Since there are no restrictions on variables we can
rename
 
b via 	b
i

  a
i
in  With contraction we obtain a proof of 
N
 

P
A	 a
 	or A	 a

N
  
N


	
 The last inference in  is 	nec
r

 Add a 	nec
inference to the LBproof
	
 The last inference in  is 	nex
r

 Add a 	nex
inference to the LBproof  
If there were a resolution proof of  which does not use the goal clause f F g then
we could translate that into an LBproof of the empty sequent  Such a proof of
course is impossible Hence any resolution derivation of  must use the goal clause
f F g By the degree restriction the last inference in such a derivation must be
a resolution between fF g and f F g A resolution derivation of fF g can as
above be translated into an LBproof of  F 
Remark 
 Observe that the degree restriction on the resolution rule is necessary
for soundness Otherwise eg P   P would have the following proof
f P   P g fP  P   P g
fP g
res
f P g
nec
f P   P g f  P  P   P g
f  P g
res

res
In fact a formula  F has a refutation without degree restriction i j F  but
j F is not equivalent to j F 	in contrast to   and
 
 cf Lemma 

Theorem 	 The resolution calculus for TB is complete If j F  then  is deriv
able from Cl	F 

Proof We give for each LBproof  of a sequent  F  a resolution proof of 
from Cl	F 
 By Theorem  we can assume that  is cutfree analytic that its
axioms are atomic and by Proposition  that it contains no weakenings Let
   be a sequent in  As can easily be seen a formula A occurs positively
	negatively
 in    i it occurs positively 	negatively
 in F  Furthermore every
formula A in  corresponds to exactly one subsemiformulaA

of F  which can be
determined by tracing the formula A downwards through  We translate  to a
resolution proof  of fF g by induction on its subproofs 

 If 

ends in   
then 

ends in  N

 P
	
 where the semiformulas whose codes occur in 

 

are those subsemiformulas of F corresponding to the formulas in    There
is no variable restriction on the last clause in 

 We present here some cases

	
 

is an axiom
Translate P 	 a
 P 	 a
 to a clause f P 	 	
	 a
 P 	
 

	 a
g where P 	 	
 	P 	
 



is the subsemiformula of F corresponding to the left 	right
 P 	 a
 	This clause
is in Ax 	F 


	
 

ends in a contraction on a formula A
By induction hypothesis we have a resolution proof of  N

 P
	

fA

	 a
 A

	
 
b
g without restriction of variables 	A

is the subsemiformula
of F corresponding to A
 Apply 	fact

	
 

ends in 	right

By induction hypothesis we have resolution proofs ending in  N

P
	
fA

g
and  N

 
P
	
 
 fB

g The clause f A

 B

 A

B

g is in Cl	F 
 We
obtain a resolution proof
f A

 B

 A

B

g




 N

 P
	
 fA

g
 N

 P
	
 fA

B

 B

g




 N

 
 P
	
 
 fB

g
 N

  N

 
 P
	
 P
	
 
 fA

B

g
	
 

ends in 	left

By induction hypothesis we have a resolution proof ending in f A

	x
	a
g 
 N

 P
	
g The clause fA

	x
	b
 	x
A

	x
g is in Cl	F 
 We obtain a
resolution proof




f A

	x
	a
g   N

 P
	
fA

	x
	b
 	x
A

	x
g
f 	x
A

	x
g   N

 P
	
	
 

ends in 	right

By induction hypothesis we have a resolution proof of    fA	x
	a
gg
The clause f A	x
	b
 	x
A	x
g
b
is in Cl	F 
 We obtain the resolution
proof




 N

 P
	
 fA	x
	a
g f A	x
	b
 	x
A	x
g
b
 N

 P
	
 f	x
A	x
g
Note that the conditions on b in the right premise are met since a satises the
eigenvariable condition
	
 

ends in 	 left

By induction hypothesis we have a resolution proof of f A

 
 
 A

g 
 N

P
	
 The clauses fA

  A

g and f
 
 A

  A

g are in Cl	F 
 We
obtain a resolution proof




f A

 
 
 A

g   N

 P
	
fA

  A

g
f 
 
 A

  A

g   N

 P
	
f
 
 A

  A

g
f  A

g   N

 P
	
	
 

ends in 	nex

Append a 	nex
r

inference to the resolution proof to obtain 


	
 

ends in 	nec

Append a 	nec
r

 inference to the resolution proof to obtain 



Note that in the translation to resolution the restriction on the rules are all satised
The uniers can be chosen so that only the variables in the clauses from Cl	F 
 are
substituted into Given a proof  of F we thus have a resolution proof  of fF g
from clauses in Cl	F 
 By resolving with f F g  Cl	F 
 we obtain   
The translation above shows actually that a renement of resolution is complete
namely where every resolution step has to involve at least one input clause ie a
clause form Cl	F 
 The resolution method developed here diers signicantly from
the resolution method of Robinson developed for classical clause logic hence the
fact that input resolution is complete is not a contradiction to the wellknown
fact that input resolution in the classical case is not complete
 Conclusion
We have seen how the passage from a nonaxiomatizable temporal semantics to
an axiomatizable one is paralleled by an extension of the completeness proof of
the propositional logic The point where the proof fails for TL is where a true
formula starting with   is reduced even innitely often but no derivation can be
obtained The extension of the semantics is prompted by this phenomenon and
makes a complete reduction of the formula possible The reduction discussed here is
very similar to Krogers completeness proof for propositional TL This prompts the
question of how to extend similar propositional completeness proofs to the rstorder
case by avoiding nonaxiomatizability of the standard semantics by extension of the
semantics itself A candidate for such investigations would be eg innitevalued
#Lukasiewicz logic It also prompts the question for a characterization of classes of
formulas where a sequent calculus is complete for the original semantics say as
those formulas where the reduction works
It is quite natural to ask whether the predicate logic of linear time with gaps
	the structures being sequences of segments
 is axiomatizable or not let us call
this logic TLG Indeed even the pure  part of TLG is not axiomatizable This
result can be obtained by reducing the problem to the nonaxiomatizability of the
innitevalued Godel logic with truth values from the set f
 
n
jn  N  fgg  fg
However the proof of this result is quite involved placing it outside the scope of
this paper It will be presented elsewhere
Another problem which has not been addressed in depth so far is the corre
spondence between temporal logics discussed here and number theory The proof
of nonaxiomatizability of TL by reduction to arithmetic and the induction rule
of propositional TL suggest that there is a close relation This suggestion is sup
ported by our result the semantics of TB is a nonstandard semantics similar
to nonstandard models of arithmetic Viewed this way it is not as surprising that
TB would have a complete axiomatization
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